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Telephone: (801) 403-8279 " " 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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"COUBTOFAPPEAIS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
U.P.C.,INC. d/b/a ; 
GARCO INDUSTRIAL PARK, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a ] 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ] 
Defendant and Appellee. ] 
) RULE 24(i) RESPONSE TO R.O.A.'S 
) SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES 
> Docket No. 980280-CA 
l Trial Court Civil No. 960906388 
Pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco 
Industrial Park responds to the supplemental authorities submitted by R.O.A. General, Inc. d/b/a 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising on or about May 17, 1999. The reasons ROA gave for the 
supplemental citations are not valid based on the following: 
1. Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc.. 959 P.2d 102, 108 (Utah 1998). 
ROA submitted this case on the unlawful detainer issue. The language to which ROA refers the 
Court is mere dicta, and deals not with unlawful detainer but with forcible entry, a statute not 
implicated in this action, dealing with issues not raised in this action. ROA is improperly seeking 
to raise an entirely new issue not raised before the trial court, for the first time after the matter has 
been fully briefed and argued on appeal. Therefore, the case is not a "pertinent and significant 
authority" allowed under Rule 24(i), and the reason ROA gave for the supplemental citation is not 
valid. 
2. Murray City Zoning Ordinance §17,68.160.C and Salt Lake County Ordinance 
§ 19.82.100. ROA submitted these ordinances on the issue whether ROA may have violated Utah's 
antitrust law and thereby interfered with Garco's prospective econ >• relations by an improper 
means. ROA has never argued that a "county/municipality action doctrine" exception to state 
antitrust liability has ever been adopted by any state, or should be adopted hv flu slate of Utah, 
either before the trial court, in its Appellee's Brief or during oral argument before this Court. 1 
Because Ri )A lias not argued the issue, Garco has had no opportunity to respond to any argument 
ROA might have raised. Whether such an exception to Utah antitrusi law exists is not before the 
Court on appeal. Therefore, the ordinances are not "pertinent and significant authorities" allowed 
under Rule 24(i), and the reason ROA gave for the supplemental citations is not valid. 
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CERTIFICATE Ol SI K\ l( I 
II. I certify on May 1999 a true and correct copy of the above was served by first-class mail 
to: 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 





A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
525 EAST FIRST SOUTH, 5th FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
(801) 532-2666 
(801) 355-1813 FAX 
(801) 364-3002 FAX 
Utah Court of Aopeals 
MAY 1 7 1999 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
Mailing Address 
POST OFFICE BOX 11008 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84147-0008 
Richard A Rappaport 
Roger G Segal 
Jeffrey L Silvestrim 
David S Dolowitz 
Vernon L Hopkinson 
John T Morgan 
Keith M Meade 
Ray M Beck 
A O Headman 
UTAH COURT g 
e a ^Jjk a ft 
OF &&&* 
Julie A Bryan 
Erik Strindberg 
Jeffrey K Oritt 
Daniel J Torkelson 
Leslie Van Frank 
Ralph E Chamness 
Brian F Roberts 
*pettdC Sarandos 




Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, # 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
50 
S O C K E T ^ 
^ro^g^=-
Re: UPC, dba Garco Industrial Park v. ROA General, dba Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising; Case No. 980280-CA 
Dear Clerk: 
The above-referenced matter is scheduled for oral argument tomorrow, May 18, 1999 
at 9:30 a.m. Pursuant to Rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following 
pertinent and significant authorities have come to the attention of Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising with regard to the above-referenced matter. 
1. Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc.. 959 P.2d 102, 108 (Utah 
1998). The Court's discussion at page 108 pertains to the unlawful detainer issue discussed 
at pages 28 and 29 of Garco's Opening Brief, pages 46 and 47 of Reagan's Brief, and page 
15 of Garco's Reply Brief. This citation came to Reagan's attention as a result of arguments 
made by Garco in its Reply Brief regarding the unlawful detainer issue. 
2. Murray City Zoning Ordinance, § 17.68.160.C and Salt Lake County 
Ordinance § 19.82.100. These supplemental citations pertain to the assertion made by 
Garco, for the first time on appeal, on p. 11 of its Reply Brief that a state anti-trust claim is 
pending against Reagan and that no county or city ordinances would be at issue such that a 
Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
May 17, 1999 
Page 2 
"County/Municipality Action Doctrine" could immunize actions performed under county or 
city ordinances. 
These supplemental citations came to Reagan's attention in preparation for oral 
argument. 
Sincerely, 
Leslie Van Frank 
LVF/db 
Enclosures 
cc: F. Mark Hansen (via hand-delivery) 
F \LESLIE\MAY99\GARCO-LT WPD 
ZONING 
ORDINANCE 
Murray City • • 
17.68.160 
17.68.160 Off-premise signs. 
Except where otherwise prohibited by this chap-
ter, off-premise signs may be erected and main-
tained in commercial and manufacturing zones sub-
ject to. the following conditions: 
A. Size. 
1. Freeway Orientation. The maximum size of 
an off-premise sign located within 300 feet of 1-15 
or 1-215 in the C-D and M-G zones shall be 672 
square feet in area exclusive of temporary cut-outs; 
2. Non-Freeway Orientation. In the C-N\ C-D 
and M-G zones, off-premise signs located over 300 
feet distance from 1-15 and 1-215 shall not exceed 
300 square feet in area. 
B. Pole Support. All off-premise signs shall be 
of mono-pole (single support structure) design and 
construction. 
C. Separation. A minimum of 500 feet radial 
spacing from any other off-premise advertising sign. 
D. Setback. No part of any sign may be located 
nearer than two feet to any property line or right-of-
way. 
E. The maximum height limit for off-premise 
signs is as follows: 
1. In the C-D and M-G zone (freeway oriented): 
35 feet above freeway grade or ground level which-
ever is greater; 
2. In the C-N, C-D and M-G zones (non-free-
way oriented): 35 feet above ground level. 
F. Clearance. The minimum sign clearance from 
grade to the bottom of the sign is eight feet. (Ord. 
906 § 3.07) 
P.68.170 Floodplain. 
As approved by the planning commission by 
conditional use permit. (Ord. 906 § 3.08) 
17.68.180 Electronic message centers. 
Electronic message centers require conditional 
use permit approval in the C-D and M-G zones. In 
addition to the restrictions found in this chapter and 
the other chapters which apply to the zones men-
tioned above, electronic message centers are subject 
to the following restrictions: 
A. Electronic message centers are not allowed 
off-premise. 
B. All electronic message centers must have an 
automatic dimmer to reduce sign intensity after 
dark. 
C. Lamp size may not exceed 54 watts of in-
candescent lighting for day time usage. An auto-
matic dimmer must be installed to reduce nighttime 
wattage to 30 watts. Light emitting diodes and mag-
netic discs may be used, if the light intensity is not 
greater than that produced by incandescent lighting. 
D. An electronic message center may not flash 
or scintillate, except to change the displayed word-
ing to different wording. 
E. Any display on the electronic message center 
must remain lighted for at least two seconds. 
F. An electronic message center located within 
500 feet of a residential area, or as otherwise deter-
mined by the planning commission, may not operate 
between the hours of ten p.m. and six a.m. of the 
following day. 
G. A minimum of five percent of the time the 
sign is in use the message shall be devoted to public 
service messages. (Ord. 906 § 3.09) 
17.68-190 Sexually oriented business signs. 
Sexually oriented business signs are limited as 
follows: 
A. No more than one sign is allowed per busi-
ness; 
B. No sign may exceed 18 square feet in area; 
C. No animation is permitted on or around any 
sexually oriented business sign or on the exterior 
walls or roof of the business premises; 
D. No descriptive art or designs depicting any 
activity related to or implying, the nature of the 
business is allowed. Signs may contain alphanu-
meric copy only; 
E. Only single face wall signs are permitted; 
F. Other than the signs specifically allowed by 
this ordinance, a sexually oriented business may not 
use any temporary sign, banner, light or other de-
vice designed or intended to draw attention to the 
business location. (Ord. 906 § 3.10) 
428 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
CODE OF ORDINANCES 
1986 
A Codification of the General Ordinances 
of Salt Lake County, Utah 
Codified, Indexed and Published by 
BOOK PUBLISHING COMPANY 
201 Westlake Avenue North 
Seattle, Washington 98109 
19.82.080 Size computation. 
A. The following shall be used when calculating 
sign sizes: When more than one use occupies a lot, 
the frontage may be used to calculate the sign size 
for one total ground or projecting sign, not for each 
use. The total may then be divided between the 
uses. There may be any number of flat or wall 
signs, provided their total does not exceed the per-
centage of wall area coverage allowed. 
B. A property line which abuts a nonaccess 
freeway, road, street or right-of-way may not be 
used in computing sign area. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 
1988) 
19.82.085 Height of ground signs. 
The height of ground signs, except as otherwise 
specified in this chapter, shall be measured from the 
grade at the property line of the yard in which the 
sign is located, but shall not exceed the height al-
lowed in the zone. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 1988) 
19.82.090 Imprint of ownership required. 
The imprint of the sign owner and sign erector of 
all signs shall be in plain and public view. (Ord. 
1034 § 1 (part), 1988) 
19.82.100 Off-premises sign requirements. 
Off-premises signs erected along the interstate or 
the primary highway system as defined by the state 
shall conform with the provisions of the Utah Out-
door Advertising Act. (Ord. 1106 § 5, 1990: Ord. 
1034 § 1 (part), 1988) 
19.82.110 Visibility at intersections. 
A. There shall be a minimum clearance of ten 
feet between the ground and any part of a projecting 
sign or ground sign, as measured from the grade of 
the intersecting streets and located within the clear 
view of an intersection, which is a triangular area 
formed by the street property lines and a line con-
necting them at points forty feet from the intersec-
tion of the street lines. Any portion of a sign struc-
ture within the clear view of an intersection and 
nearer the ground than ten feet may not exceed ten 
inches in width, thickness or diameter. 
B. A service sign located within the clear view 
of an intersection shall not exceed two feet in 
height. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 1988) 
19.82.120 Signs on public property. 
No sign shall be located on publicly owned land 
or inside street rights-of-way except signs required 
and erected by permission of an authorized public 
agency. Signs shall include, but not be limited to, 
handbills, posters, advertisements or notices that are 
fastened, placed, posted, painted or attached in any 
way upon any curbstone, lamppost, telephone pole, 
telegraph pole, electric light or power pole, hydrant, 
bridge, tree, rock, sidewalk or street. (Ord. 1034 § 
1 (part), 1988) 
19.82.130 Lighted signs. 
A. A lighted sign shall not be installed which 
permits the light to penetrate beyond the property in 
such a manner as to annoy or interfere with the use 
of adjacent properties. 
B. Such lights alleged to violate subsection A of 
this section by the adjacent property owners or 
development services division director shall be 
subject to a public hearing before the planning com-
mission as to the validity of the alleged violation. 
If such light is determined to be in violation, the 
owner of the light shall take appropriate, corrective 
action as directed. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 1988) 
19.82.140 Mobile sign. 
One mobile sign may be used for each use for a 
period of sixty days following the issuance of a 
permit to construct a permanent sign for that use. 
Upon inspection and approval of the permanent 
sign, or upon expiration of the sixty-day period, 
whichever first occurs, the mobile sign must be 
removed. Mobile signs may not employ animation, 
flashing lights or intermittent lights. (Ord. 1034 § 
1 (part), 1988) 
19.82.150 Traffic hazard prohibited. 
Signs or other advertising structures shall not be 
erected at the intersection of any streets or drive-
ways in such manner as to obstruct free and clear 
689 (Salt Lake Count> 2-98) 
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Dr. Clyde B. KELLER, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
SOUTHWOOD NORTH MEDICAL PA-
VILION, INC., a Utah corporation, and 
Dr. Robert L. Youngblood, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 970090. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 28, 1998. 
Commercial lessee sued lessor for tres-
pass, conversion, and interference with pro-
spective business advantage, after lessor re-
moved from a business monument signs 
identifying lessee's business, and lessee's tri-
al brief raised the additional statutory claim 
of forcible entn*. Following a trial, the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Divi-
sion I, Anne M. Stirba, J., entered judgment 
for lessee and awarded treble damages as to 
the forcible entn* claim. Lessor appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held 
that: (1) the parties tried the forcible entn' 
claim by implied consent; (2) defendant 
waived defenses that were not raised in re-
sponsive pleadings; and (3) lessee's interest 
in the signs was a 'license," not a 'lease/' 
and thus, lessee's interest was not protected 
by the forcible entry statute. 
Judgment modified to exclude treble 
damages. 
Russon, J., concurred in the result and 
filed an opinion. 
1. Pleading 0=427 
Party may give implied consent to try 
issue not raised by the pleadings when party 
does not object to the introduction of evi-
dence at trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b). 
2. Pleading 0427 
Fact that plaintiff did not move to 
amend the pleadings to include his forcible 
entry claim did not make the trial court's 
consideration of the claim inappropriate, 
where claim was tried by implied consent of 
3. Appeal and Error e=>949 
Appellate court reviews for correctness 
trial court's application of civil procedure rule 
allowing issues not raised in pleadings to be 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b). 
4. Appeal and Error 0949 
Appellate court grants trial court fairly 
broad measure of discretion in determining 
under given set of facts whether parties have 
given implied consent to try issues not raised 
in pleadings, as such determination is highly 
fact intensive. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b). 
5. Pleading 0=>427 
Evidence supported finding that the par-
ties, by implied consent, tried plaintiffs stat-
utory forcible entn claim which was not 
raised in pleadings; defendant made no ob-
jection before or during trial to presentation 
of evidence related to forcible entn' issue, 
both parties substantively addressed the is-
sue in their trial briefs, and both parties 
addressed the issue again during closing ar-
gument. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1 et seq.; Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b). 
6. Forcible Entn and Detainer <5=>25(1) 
Defendant waives defense that plaintiff 
failed to comply with statutory indorsement 
requirement for forcible entry claim if defen-
dant fails to raise the defense in a responsive 
pleading or by motion before submitting a 
responsive filing. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-8; 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 12(h). 
7. Landlord and Tenant 0=>291(7) 
Party waived statute of limitations de-
fense to statutory forcible entn' claim by 
failing to raise the defense in a responsive 
pleading or by motion before submitting a 
responsive filing. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1 et 
seq.; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 12(h). 
8. Landlord and Tenant c=»291(7) 
Assuming that one-year limitations peri-
od applied to statutory forcible entry claim, 
plaintiffs claim was timely, though claim was 
not raised in plaintiffs timely initial pleading 
and more than one year elapsed between the 
alleged forcible entn and plaintiffs first 
mention of the claim, as claim was tried by 
KELLER v. SOUTHWOOD . \UKin m ^ , 
Cite as 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998) 
V n a j M. - -
implied consent of parties and thus related 
back to initial pleading. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1 
et seq.; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b, c). 
9. Pleading c=>255.1 
Defendant, who expressly waived certain 
defenses in a post-trial hearing, could not use 
civil procedure rule permitting amendment of 
pleadings to revive those defenses. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rules 12(h), 15(a). 
10. Landlord and Tenant C=>20 
Licenses 0=^44(2) 
A 'lease" conveys an interest in land and 
transfers possession, and thus must convey a 
definite space and transfer exclusive posses-
sion of that space to the lessee, while a 
''license" in real property is the permission 
or authority to engage in a particular act or 
series of acts upon the land of another with-
out possessing an interest therein, and is 
thus subject to the management and control 
retained by the owner. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
11. Landlord and Tenant c=>20 
Licenses C=>44(2) 
In determining whether an instrument 
creates a lease or a license, the intention of 
the parties as ascertained from the instru-
ment itself prevails, but a court is not bound 
by the parties' characterization of their 
transaction or by any title they may have 
given a writing. 
12. Landlord and Tenant <>39, 287.1 
Lease agreement for commercial prem-
ises gave lessee a 'license," rather than a 
"lease," as to signs identifying lessee's busi-
ness on a business monument, and thus, forc-
ible entry statute, which protected only real 
property interests, did not protect lessee as 
to lessor's unauthorized removal of the signs; 
lease agreement did not transfer possession 
of any part of the monument to lessee, assign 
any definite space to him, or give him exclu-
d e possession of any space on the monu-
ment, but instead simply gave him permis-
13. Forcible Entry and Detainer e=>l 
A sign is not "real property," for pur-
poses of forcible entry statute governing en-
try upon or into real property, though the 
sign is affixed to a structure on real proper-
ty, as a sign is not a type of property that 
people can occupy. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1(1, 
2). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
14. Landlord and Tenant C=*275 
At common law, a landlord could use 
self-help to forcibly enter a tenant's premises 
and evict the tenant without running the risk 
of incurring civil liability. 
15. Forcible Entry and Detainer O l 
Forcible entry statute protects only 
types of property that people can occupy. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1(1, 2;. 
Vincent C. Rampton. Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Harold G. Christensen, Ryan E. Tibbitts, 
Paul M. Halliday, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dants. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice. 
Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc., 
and Dr. Robert L. Youngblood (collectively, 
"Youngblood") appeal a trial court award of 
treble damages against them and in favor of 
Dr. Clyde B. Keller. Keller brought an ac-
tion against Youngblood for trespass, conver-
sion, and interference with prospective busi-
ness advantage after Youngblood removed 
two signs owned by Keller from a business 
monument. Keller also argued that Young-
blood violated Utah's forcible entry statute. 
The trial court found that Youngblood's re-
moval of the signs violated the forcible entry 
statute and awarded Keller treble damages 
under that statute. See Utah Code §§78-
36-1 & -10. On appeal, Youngblood argues 
that the trial court erred in finding for Keller 
on his forcible entry claim because Keller 
failed to plead forcible entry in his complaint, 
failed to comply with the statute's require-
on to place two signs on the monument, ments, and failed to bring his claim within 
U.C.A IQSO no o/? i / i ^ . i _ . _^_ . * ,. - . „ . . . . . _ . i 
•
C
-A1953, 78-36-1(1, 2). the statute's one-year limitations period. 
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Youngblood also argues that Keller's access 
to signage space did not constitute real prop-
erty and therefore was not covered by the 
forcible entry statute and argues that the 
trial court erred in awarding treble damages. 
We modify the ruling to exclude the treble 
damages award. 
We first review the facts before turning to 
the standard of review and our analysis. In 
June of 1991, Keller leased office space from 
WCJD, Ltd. ("WCJD"), to house his chiro-
practic business. The space leased was in 
Southwood Plaza-South, an office building 
that, together with Southwood Plaza-North, 
forms the Southwood Medical Pavilion and 
Plaza ("Medical Pavilion") in Sandy, Utah. 
The Medical Pavilion has a large monument 
facing the street. Under the terms of their 
leases. Medical Pavilion tenants could place 
signs, typically small brass plaques, on this 
monument to advertise their services. The 
standard lease WCJD used for Southwood-
Plaza tenants, including Keller, provided that 
each tenant could put a sign on the monu-
ment but that all signs had to "be in keeping 
with other signs" as to size and location.1 
Keller, however, wanted a larger sign than 
the other tenants because he did not have an 
established practice in the area. WCJD 
agreed to allow him to place a 30-inch by 60-
inch sign on each side of the monument, 
subject to WCJD's approval of the signs. 
Keller agreed to pay WCJD an additional 
$50 per month for this privilege. Keller and 
WCJD memorialized this agreement in an 
addendum to their lease agreement.2 WCJD 
later approved Keller's signs, which were 
affixed to the monument with construction 
adhesive. 
1. Paragraph 12 of the WCJD Lease provided: 
ERECTIOS ASD RE\iO\AL OF SIGNS 
Tenant may place suitable signs on the Premis-
es for the purpose of indicating the nature of 
the business carried on by Tenant m the Prem-
ises; provided however, that the location and 
size of such signs shall be in keeping with 
other signs in the Building where Premises are 
located Tenant shall remove such signs at 
the expiration ot thi* Lease or earlier termi-
nation thereof and repair am damage to the 
Premises caused bv buch removal. 
2. The addendum provided in pertinent part. 
In June of 1992, WCJD conveyed its inter-
est in the Southwood Plaza-North building 
and property, including the monument, to 
Valley Bank* & Trust. In October of 1992, 
Valley Bank & Trust conveyed this property 
to Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc., a 
corporation Dr. Youngblood formed for the 
purpose of owning and managing this proper-
ty. WCJD retained title to Southwood Pla-
za-South. 
Shortly after the conveyance, Youngblood 
spoke to Keller about his signs. Youngblood 
told Keller that his signs were "unprofession-
al" and that they should be removed. At this 
time, Youngblood was unaware of the adden-
dum to Keller's lease addressing the signs, 
and Keller was unaware that Youngblood's 
corporation owned the property on which the 
monument sits. Keller did not remove the 
signs. 
Approximately fourteen months later. 
Youngblood removed the two signs during 
daylight hours and in Keller's absence but 
without permission from or notice to Keller. 
Keller objected, and after attempts to resolve 
the problem failed, he relocated his practice 
to another building. 
Keller then fried suit against Youngblood 
and his corporation, alleging trespass, con-
version, and interference with prospective 
business advantage. On June 18, 1996, Kel-
ler submitted a trial brief addressing these 
issues. Two days later, Keller submitted a 
supplemental trial brief, asserting for the 
first time that Youngblood had violated the 
forcible entry statute. On June 24. 1996, 
Youngblood submitted his trial brief, ad-
dressing the merits of Keller's forcible entry 
claim as well as the three original claims. 
Youngblood did not object to the late asser-
C. Owner agrees to allow tenant to install 
at tenant's own expense and risk, two 30 inch 
bv 60 inch fiat, non-electric signs, one on each 
side of the front monument. 
(a) The signs shall not interfere with am 
existing signs alreadv in place. 
(b) The signs must conform to any and all 
State or Local code or regulation. An> 
problems or costs shall be the Tenant's sole 
risk and expense. 
(c) The design and copv of signs must meet 
with owners written approval 
(d) Tenant agrees to pax an additional 
$50.00 per month for this sign space. 
Cite as 959 P.2d 
tion of the forcible entry claim as outside the 
pleadings, nor did he assert a statute of 
limitations defense or argue that Keller 
failed to comply with the forcible entry stat-
ute's requirements. 
The trial court found that YoungbloocPs 
actions constituted trespass, conversion, in-
terference with prospective business advan-
tage, and forcible entry, and awarded Keller 
actual and punitive damages. At the close of 
trial, Keller reminded the court that under 
the forcible entry statute, he was entitled to 
treble damages. The court awarded treble 
damages but allowed post-trial briefing and a 
hearing on the treble damages issue. Fol-
lowing this hearing, the court reaffirmed its 
treble damages award. 
On appeal, Youngblood argues that the 
trial court erred in finding for Keller on the 
forcible entry claim because (i) Keller failed 
to plead forcible entry in his complaint, (ii) 
he failed to satisfy the statute's indorsement 
requirements. • iil > a special one-year statute 
of limitations barred recovery, and (iv) Kel-
ler's access to signage space did not consti-
tute "real property" within the meaning of 
the forcible entry statute. We address each 
question in turn. 
[1] Youngblood first claims that Keller's 
failure to include the forcible entry claim in 
his complaint bars any recover}' under Utah's 
forcible entry statute. Keller responds that 
the parties tried the claim by implied con-
sent. Rule 15'b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure applies wThen parties try by ex-
press or implied consent issues not raised in 
the pleadings. Rule 15'b) provides: 
When issues not raised by the pleading are 
tried by exr ress or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all respects 
as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 
Such amendments of the pleadings as may 
be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may 
be made upon motion of any party at any 
*- The fact thai Keller did not move to amend the 
Pleadings to include his forcible entry claim does 
not make ihe inal court's consideration of the 
claim inappropriate. Rule 15(b) states that "fail-
ure so to amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of issues [tried by express or implied 
consent]." I ;ah R.Civ.P. 15(b); see also Clark v. 
102 (Utah 1998) 
time, even after judgment; but failure so 
to amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 15(b). "A finding of implied 
consent 'depends on whether the parties rec-
ognized that an issue not presented by the 
pleadings entered the case at trial.'" Do-
mar Ocean Transp. v. Independent Refining 
Co., 783 F.2d 1185, 1188 (5th Cir.1986) (quot-
ing Jimenez v. Tuna Vessel GRANADA 652 
F.2d 415 (5th Cir.1981)). A party may give 
implied consent when it does not object to 
the introduction of evidence at trial. See 
General /«.s. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynas-
ty Corp.. 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976). 
However, "[wjhen evidence is introduced that 
is relevant to a pleaded issue and the party 
against whom the amendment is urged has 
no reason to believe a new issue is being 
injected into the case, that party cannot be 
said to have impliedly consented to trial of 
that issue." Domar Ocean Transp., 783 F.2d 
at 1188. 
[2] In applying rule 15Ho), the trial court 
should assess whether the parties tried an 
issue by express or implied consent. See 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). Once the court concludes that 
the parties did, the court must treat the 
issues in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. See Zions First 
Natl Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irr., Inc., 795 
P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1990); Pouhen v. Poul-
sen, 672 P.2d 97, 99 (Utah 1983).3 
[3, 4] Our review of the trial court's ap-
plication of rule 15(b) is a legal question that 
we review for "correctness." See State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). How-
ever, because the trial court's determination 
of whether the issues were tried with all 
parties' "implied consent" is highly fact in-
tensive, we grant the trial court a fairly 
broad measure of discretion in making that 
determination under a given set of facts. See 
id. at 939. 
Second Cir. Ct.t 741 P.2d 956, 957 (Utah 1987) 
("[Fjailure to move to amend the pleadings to 
conform to the evidence does not affect the fact 
that those issues were in fact tried by the consent 
of the parties and were therefore before the 
court."). 
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[5] We conclude that the trial court did 
not err by addressing the forcible entry is-
sue. The record contains substantial evi-
dence indicating that Youngblood tried the 
forcible entry claim by implied consent. 
Youngblood made no objection before or dur-
ing trial to the presentation of evidence relat-
ed to the forcible entry issue, and both par-
ties substantively addressed the issue in 
their trial briefs. Importantly, Youngblood 
reviewed Keller's supplemental trial brief 
that outlined the forcible entry claim before 
he submitted his trial brief. Instead of ob-
jecting to the claim as being outside of the 
pleadings or barred by a defense, Young-
blood addressed the claim on the merits. 
And both parties addressed the issue again 
during closing argument. Keller's attorney 
stated: 
[Youngblood] violated the forcible entry 
statute. . . . We have, likewise, relied on 
the proposition that the removal and de-
struction of the sign constituted forcible 
entry. And there was a suggestion in 
[defendant's trial] brief . . . that the forc-
ible entry statute does not apply. It clear-
ly applies. It couldn't be more apropos in 
this situation.... There is a suggestion in 
[defendant's trial] brief that somehow [the 
statute] applies only to houses or enclo-
sures. I don't read that in the statute and 
I saw no case law for the proposition, nor 
do I know of [any] anywhere else. It's 
intended to apply to all leaseholds, proper-
ty. This was property. It was a fixture 
permanently affixed subject to a valid 
leasehold. 
4. Assuming, arguendo, that a one-year limita-
tions period applies, the statute of limitations 
defense fails e\en if Youngblood did not waive it 
Youngblood bases his statute of limitations de-
fense on the fact that more than one year elapsed 
between his removal of the sign and Keller's first 
mention of the forcible entry claim. This argu-
ment, however, ignores the fact that rule 15(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
amended claims relate back to the date of the 
original filing 
Rule 15(c) provides that a claim asserted in an 
amended pleading relates back to the date of the 
original pleading whenever the claim "arose out 
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth . . in the original pleading." Utah 
R.Civ.P. 15(c). Because the parties tried the 
forcible entry claim by implied consent, Keller's 
Youngblood's attorney responded by arguing 
that the sign was not real property, was not 
a fixture, and was not permanently attached. 
Because these facts are enough to support 
the conclusion that Youngblood tried the 
forcible entry claim by implied consent, we 
find that the court properly considered this 
issue. 
[6, 7] In a post-trial brief, Youngblood for 
the first time argued that the one-year stat-
ute of limitations of section 78-12-29(2 > 
barred the forcible entry claim and that the 
court's failure to indorse on the summons the 
number of days within which the defendant 
must appear, as required by section 78-36-8 
of the Code, precluded recovery under the 
statute. We find that both of these defenses 
were waived. 
[8, 9] Under rule 12 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, "[a] party waives all defens-
es and objections which he does not present 
either by motion . , . or, if he has made no 
motion, in his answer or reply.'' Utah 
R.Civ.P. 12(h). A party waives a statute of 
limitations defense by failing to raise it in a 
responsive pleading or by motion before sub-
mitting a responsive filing. See Staker i\ 
Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co., 664 P.2d 
1188, 1190 (Utah 1983); Utah R.Civ.P. 12(h). 
Likewise, a party's failure to comply with 
section 78-36-8,s indorsement requii'ement is 
a waiveable defense. See Fowler v. Seiter, 
838 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Be-
cause Youngblood failed to raise the statute 
of limitations4 and statutory compliance de-
fenses before he submitted a response—in 
this case his trial brief—he waived those 
defenses.5 
complaint was amended for purposes of rule 15. 
Further, because the forcible entry claim arose 
out of the same conduct >et forth in Keller's 
original complaint, rule 15 c) applies. Accord-
ingly, a one->ear statute of limitations would not 
bar Keller's claim because the 15(b) amendment 
relates back to the filing date of Keller's com-
plaint. Because we find that Dr. Youngblood 
waived the statute of limitations defense, we 
need not decide whether a one-year limitations 
period, in fact, applies to a forcible entry claim. 
5. We recognize that rule l^: of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure can operaie as an exception to 
the general rule that a party waives a defense b\ 
failing to raise it in a responsive filing. Under 
rule 15(a), a part} ma\ amend its pleading to 
assert a defense that it failed to raise in a respon-
Cite as 959 P.2d 
Moreover, Youngblood expressly waived 
these defenses during the post-trial hearing 
on the treble damages issue. Youngblood's 
attorney stated: 
After reading [plaintiffs] memorandum on 
the issue of waiver, Fm reluctantly inclined 
to agree that, although my predecessor 
counsel certainly should have objected, he 
didn't. And based upon that, I do think 
that those issues, [failure to plead forcible 
entry, statute of limitations, and statutory 
compliance] are probably waived. And so 
I'm not going to contest those. 
Finding that the trial court did not err in 
considering the forcible entry claim and that 
Youngblood waived any defenses, we now 
review the trial court's application of the 
forcible entry statute to the facts. Young-
blood argues that the district court erred in 
finding a forcible entry because neither Kel-
ler's sign nor his access to signage space 
constituted real property The forcible entry 
statute provides: 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, 
who either: 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or 
other parts of a house, or by fraud, intimi-
dation or stealth, or by any kind of vio-
lence or circumstances of terror, enters 
upon or into real property; or, 
(2) after entering peaceably upon real 
property, turns out by force, threats or 
menacing conduct the party in actual pos-
session. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-1 (emphasis add-
ed). The district court made three conclu-
sions of law pertinent to the "real property" 
issue. It ruled that the monument was real 
property because it "was permanently affixed 
to real property"; that Keller's lease gave 
him "a valid and enforceable leasehold inter-
est" m the monument; and that Keller's 
lease rights in the monument "constituted a 
leasehold m realty." The district court then 
concluded that Youngblood committed a forc-
ible entry "in that [he] forcibly deprived 
Plaintiff of peaceable possession of his lease-
hold by self-help." 
Slve pleading if the part\ has lea\e of the court or 
consent of the adverse part\ See Stakei v Hunt-
l
*&on Cle\ eland In Co 664 P 2d 1188, 1190 
vutah 1983) However because Youngblood ex-
102 (Utah 1998) 
Because the trial court's finding of a forc-
ible entry turns on its conclusion that Keller 
had a valid leasehold in real property, we 
must first determine if a leasehold existed. 
This determination is a question of law that 
we review for correctness. See Pena, 869 
P.2d at 936. 
[10] A lease "conveys an interest in land 
and transfers possession." 49 Am.Jur.2d 
Landlord and Tenant § 21 (1995). A lease 
must convey a definite space and must trans-
fer exclusive possession of that space to the 
lessee. See id. In contrast, a license in real 
property "is the permission or authority to 
engage in a particular act or series of acts 
upon the land of another without possessing 
an interest therein," 25 Am.Jur.2d Ease-
ments and Licenses § 137 (1996), and is 
"subject to the management and control re-
tained by the owner." 49 Am.Jur.2d Land-
lord and Tenant § 21 (1996). 
[11] In determining whether an instru-
ment creates a lease or a license, "the inten-
tion of the parties as ascertained from the 
instrument itself prevails. Id. However, a 
court is not bound by the parties' character-
ization of their transaction or by any title 
they may have given a writing. 25 Am. 
Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 137 (1996). 
[12] We find that the lease agreement 
and the addendum gave Keller a license, not 
a leasehold interest. First, under paragraph 
12 of his lease, Keller, like all other tenants, 
had permission to place a sign on the monu-
ment. Paragraph 12 did not transfer posses-
sion of any part of the monument to Keller, 
did not assign any definite space to him, and 
did not give him exclusive possession of any 
space on the monument. Further, WCJD 
retained management and control of the 
monument under paragraph 12. 
The addendum covering Keller's signs did 
nothing to convert this license into a lease-
hold. Instead, the addendum merely altered 
paragraph 12's requirement that tenants 
could only place signs that were "in keeping 
pressK waived his defenses in the post-trial hear-
ing, he cannot avail himself of rule 15 to revive 
his defense 
108 Utah 959 PACIFIC REPORTfcK, za ar^iju, 
with other signs" on the monument. That is, 
the addendum gave Keller a license to place 
a larger sign on the monument. 
[13] For the benefit of the bench and 
bar, we think it useful to address whether 
the forcible entry statute would apply if Kel-
ler had had a valid leasehold interest. In 
other words, is a sign affixed to a structure 
on real property the type of property intend-
ed to be covered by the forcible entry stat-
ute? To understand the type of property 
covered by the forcible entry statute, we 
briefly review its history. 
[14,15] At common law, a landlord could 
use self-help to forcibly enter a tenant's 
premises and evict the tenant without run-
ning the risk of incurring civil liability. See 
Randy G. Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way 
Out: Making the Summary Eviction Pro-
cess a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative 
to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L.Rev. 759, 
776 (1994). After realizing the potential for 
violence that this rule of law created when a 
landlord used self-help to expel a tenant, 
many states passed forcible entry and detain-
er statutes.6 Id. Addressing the constitu-
tionality of Oregon's forcible entry statute, 
the United States Supreme Court stated: 
The landlord-tenant relationship was one 
of the few areas where the right to self-
help was recognized by the common law of 
most States, and the implementation of 
this right has been fraught with "violence 
and quarrels and bloodshed." . . . Hence, 
the Oregon statute was enacted in 1866 to 
alter the common law and obviate resort to 
self-help and violence. The statute, in-
tended to protect tenants as well as land-
lords, provided a speedy, judicially super-
vised proceeding to settle the possessory 
issue in a peaceful manner. 
Lindsey v. Kormet, 405 U.S. 56, 71-72, 92 
S.Ct 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972); see also 
Paxton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903, 
906 (1935) (noting that purpose of forcible 
6. Before institution of forcible entry statutes, En-
glish common law permitted one entitled to pos-
session of land to use any force reasonably neces-
sary—short of force threatening death or serious 
bodily injun-—to regain possession from another 
wrongfully withholding the land. In 1381, Eng-
land, under Richard II, passed a statute criminal-
entry statute is "to provide a speedy remedy, 
summary in character, to obtain possession 
of real property" and thereby prevent those 
seeking possession from taking "the law into 
their own hands"). Forcible entry statutes 
were designed primarily to help landlords 
and tenants settle disputes regarding posses-
sion and occupancy of real property. See 
Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 
100, 105 (1944) (Larson, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that forcible entry statute "has to do with 
actions to obtain possession, or protect one in 
retaining his occupancy of real property" 
(emphasis added)). Thus, we conclude that 
the forcible entry statute only protects types 
of property that people can occupy. A sign 
is not this type of real property, and there-
fore, the forcible entry statute does not apply 
in this situation. 
We hold that the trial court incorrectly 
concluded Keller had a leasehold interest in 
real property. Because Keller had no inter-
est in real property, the trial erred in apply-
ing the forcible entry statute. 
Judgment modified to exclude treble dam-
ages. 
HOWE, C.J., DURHAM, Associate C.J., 
and BRYNER, Judge, concur in Justice 
ZIMMERMAN'S opinion. 
RUSSON, Justice, concurring in the 
result: 
I write separately only to express my dis-
approval of the majority's advisory opinion. 
After concluding that the agreement and ad-
dendum gave Keller a license, not a leasehold 
interest, the majority states, "For the benefit 
of the bench and bar, we think it useful to 
address whether the forcible entry statute 
would apply if Keller had had a valid lease-
hold interest." Because no leasehold interest 
exists in this case, the issue as to whether 
the forcible entry statute applies to leasehold 
interests is not ripe for review. I see no 
reason to depart from our sound judicial 
izing the use of force to regain possession of 
land. In 1840, the statute was held to provide a 
basis for civil liability. See Gerchick, supra, at 
773-75. In 1872, Utah adopted a forcible entn 
statute modeled after the English statute. See 
Compiled Laws of Utah ch. 8, § 1196 (1872). 
Cite as 959 P.2d 
•olicy against rendering advisory opinions. 
lee Stewart v. Utah Public Sew. Comm% 
585 P.2d 759, 784-35 (Utah 1994) (Howe, J., 
dissenting) C'[I]t is not the province of this 
court 'to exercise the delicate power of pro-
nouncing a statute unconstitutional in ab-
stract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot cases' 
such as the one now before us." (quoting 
Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 
1980))); Olson v. Salt Lake City School DisU 
724 P.2d 960, 962 n. 1 (Utah 1986) ("This 
court will not issue advisory- opinions."); 
Justheim v Division of State Lands, 659 
P.2d 1075, 1077 (Utah 1983) (where question 
is not ripe for adjudication, court's function is 
not to render advisory opinions); Black v. 
Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 410-11 (Utah 
1982) ("Judicial policy dictates against our 
rendering an advisory opinion."); Merhish v. 
H.A. Folsom & Assoc, 646 P.2d 731, 732 
(Utah 1982) (u[S]trong judicial policy against 
issuing advisory opinions dictates that courts 
refrain from adjudicating moot questions."); 
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 504, 94 P.2d 
414, 424 (1939) (refusing to address constitu-
tionality of statute where determination not 
relevant to party's rights). 
Having disqualified himself, Justice StewT-
art does not participate herein; District 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner sat. 
Desiree HALL, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
WAL-MART STORES, INC.; Larry D. 
Moss, individually; Does I-X and Roe 
Corporations I-X, inclusive, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 970014. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 12, 1998. 
Patron sued store for negligence after 
8he was struck by vehicle in store's icy park-
109 (Utah 1998) 
ing lot. The District Court, Fifth District, 
Cedar City Department, J. Philip Eves, J., 
found store liable and awarded punitive dam-
ages. Store appealed after its motion for 
judgment notwithstanding verdict wras de-
nied. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., 
held that patron's failure to introduce evi-
dence of store's relative wealth was not fatal 
to award of punitive damages. 
Affirmed. 
Russon, J., filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Howe, J., concurred. 
1. Appeal and Error c=>237(5) 
Judgment <3=>199(5) 
Ordinarily, failure to make motion for a 
directed verdict forecloses consideration of 
later motion for judgment notwithstanding 
verdict and any appellate review of sufficien-
cy of evidence to support verdict. 
2. Appeal and Error e=>863, 934(1) 
Supreme Court will reverse trial court's 
denial of motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing verdict based on insufficient evidence to 
support verdict only if, viewing evidence in 
light most favorable to party who prevailed, 
it concludes that evidence is insufficient to 
support verdict. 
3. Appeal and Error <S=>863 
In order to prevail, party appealing de-
nial of motion for judgment notwithstanding 
verdict must marshal evidence in support of 
verdict and then demonstrate that evidence 
is insufficient when viewed in light most fa-
vorable to verdict. 
4. Damages @=*184 
Introduction of evidence as to store's 
relative wealth was not a technical prerequi-
site to an award of punitive damages in pa-
tron's negligence action against store to re-
cover for injuries sustained when she was 
struck by automobile in store's icy parking 
lot, wiiere store did not challenge awrard on 




A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
525 EAST FIRST SOUTH 5th FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84102 
(801) 532-2666 
(801) 355-1813 FAX 
(801) 364-3002 FAX 
Wailing Address 
POST OFFICE BOX 11008 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84147-0008 
Utah Court of Aooeals 
MAY 17 1999 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
Richard A Rappaport 
Roger G Segal 
Jeffrey L Silvestnni 
David S Dolowitz 
Vernon L Hopfanson 
John T Morgan 
Keith M Meade 
Ray M Beck 
A O Headman Jr 
Julie A Bryan 
Erik Strindberg 
Jeffrey K Ontt 
Daniel J Torkelson 
Leslie Van Frank 
Ralph E Chamness 
Brian F Roberts 
Dena C Sarandos 
Lauren I Sc ho I nick 
April 9, 1999 
HAND DELIVERED 
Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, # 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: UPC, dba Garco Industrial Park v. ROA General, dba Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising; Case No. 980280-CA 
Dear Clerk: 
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Advertising with regard to the above-referenced matter. 
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17.68.160 Off-premise signs. 
Except where otherwise prohibited by this chap-
ter, off-premise signs may be erected and main-
tained in commercial and manufacturing zones sub-
ject to. the following conditions: 
A. Size. 
1. Freeway Orientation. The maximum size of 
an off-premise sign located within 300 feet of 1-15 
or 1-215 in the C-D and M-G zones shall be 672 
square feet in area exclusive of temporary cut-outs; 
2. Non-Freeway Orientation. In the C-N, C-D 
and M-G zones, off-premise signs located over 300 
feet distance from 1-15 and 1-215 shall not exceed 
300 square feet in area. 
B. Pole Support. All off-premise signs shall be 
of mono-pole (single support structure) design and 
construction. 
C. Separation. A minimum of 500 feet radial 
spacing from any other off-premise advertising sign. 
D. Setback. No part of any sign may be located 
nearer than two feet to any property line or right-of-
way. 
E. The maximum height limit for off-premise 
signs is as follows: 
1. In the C-D and M-G zone (freeway oriented): 
35 feet above freeway grade or ground level which-
ever is greater; 
2. In the C-N\ C-D and M-G zones (non-free-
way oriented): 35 feet above ground level. 
F. Clearance. The minimum sign clearance from 
grade to the bottom of the sign is eight feet, (Ord. 
906 § 3.07) 
17.68.170 Floodplain. 
As approved by the planning commission by 
conditional use permit. (Ord. 906 § 3.08) 
17.68.180 Electronic message centers. 
Electronic message centers require conditional 
use permit approval in the C-D and M-G zones. In 
addition to the restnctions found in this chapter and 
the other chapters which apply to the zones men-
tioned above, electronic message centers are subject 
to the following restnctions: 
A. Electronic message centers are not allowed 
off-premise. 
B. All electronic message centers must have an 
automatic dimmer to reduce sign intensity after 
dark. 
C. Lamp size may not exceed 54 watts of in-
candescent lighting for day time usage. An auto-
matic dimmer must be installed to reduce nighttime 
wattage to 30 watts. Light emitting diodes and mag-
netic discs may be used, if the light intensity is not 
greater than that produced by incandescent lighting. 
D. An electronic message center may not flash 
or scintillate, except to change the displayed word-
ing to different wording. 
E. Any display on the electronic message center 
must remain lighted for at least two seconds. 
F. An electronic message center located within 
500 feet of a residential area, or as otherwise deter-
mined by the planning commission, may not operate 
between the hours of ten p.m. and six a.m. of the 
following day. 
G. A minimum of five percent of the time the 
sign is in use the message shall be devoted to public 
service messages. (Ord. 906 § 3.09) 
17.68.190 Sexually oriented business signs-
Sexually oriented business signs are limited as 
follows: 
A. No more than one sign is allowed per busi-
ness; 
B. No sign may exceed 18 square feet in area; 
C. No animation is permitted on or around any 
sexually oriented business sign or on the exterior 
walls or roof of the business premises; 
D. No descriptive art or designs depicting any 
activity related to or implying, the nature of the 
business is allowed. Signs may contain alphanu-
meric copy only; 
E. Only single face wall signs are permitted; 
F. Other than the signs specifically allowed by 
this ordinance, a sexually oriented business may not 
use any temporary sign, banner, light or other de-
vice designed or intended to draw attention to the 
business location. (Ord. 906 § 3.10) 
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19,82.080 Size computation. 
A. The following shall be used when calculating 
sign sizes: When more than one use occupies a lot, 
the frontage may be used to calculate the sign size 
for one total ground or projecting sign, not for each 
use. The total may then be divided between the 
uses. There may be any number of flat or wall 
signs, provided their total does not exceed the per-
centage of wall area coverage allowed. 
B. A property line which abuts a nonaccess 
freeway, road, street or right-of-way may not be 
used in computing sign area. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 
1988) 
19,82.085 Height of ground signs. 
The height of ground signs, except as otherwise 
specified in this chapter, shall be measured from the 
grade at the property line of the yard in which the 
sign is located, but shall not exceed the height al-
lowed in the zone. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 1988) 
19,82.090 Imprint of ownership required. 
The imprint of the sign owner and sign erector of 
all signs shall be in plain and public view. (Ord. 
1034 § 1 (part), 1988) 
19,82.100 Off-premises sign requirements. 
Off-premises signs erected along the interstate or 
ths primary highway system as defined by the state 
shall conform with the provisions of the Utah Out-
door Advertising Act. (Ord. 1106 § 5, 1990: Ord. 
1034 § 1 (part), 1988) 
19,82.110 Visibility at intersections. 
A. There shall be a minimum clearance of ten 
&£t between tfte ground ancf any part of a projecting 
sign or ground sign, as measured from the grade of 
the, intersecting streets and located within the clear 
vie,w of an intersection, which is a triangular area 
formed by the street property lines and a line con-
necting them at points forty feet from the intersec-
tion of the street lines. Any portion of a sign struc-
ture within the clear view of an intersection and 
ne<*rer the ground than ten feet may not exceed ten 
inches in width, thickness or diameter. 
B. A service sign located within the clear view 
of an intersection shall not exceed two feet in 
height. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 1988) 
19.82.120 Signs on public property. 
No sign shall be located on publicly owned land 
or inside street rights-of-way except signs required 
and erected by permission of an authorized public 
agency. Signs shall include, but not be limited to, 
handbills, posters, advertisements or notices that are 
fastened, placed, posted, painted or attached in any 
way upon any curbstone, lamppost, telephone pole, 
telegraph pole, electric light or power pole, hydrant, 
bridge, tree, rock, sidewalk or street. (Ord. 1034 § 
1 (part), 1988) 
19.82.130 Lighted signs. 
A. A lighted sign shall not be installed which 
permits the light to penetrate beyond the property in 
such a manner as to annoy or interfere with the use 
of adjacent properties. 
B. Such lights alleged to violate subsection A of 
this section by the adjacent property owners or 
development services division director shall be 
subject to a public hearing before the planning com-
mission as to the validity of the alleged violation. 
If such light is determined to be in violation, the 
owner of the light shall take appropriate, corrective 
action as directed. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 1988) 
19.82.140 Mobile sign. 
One mobile sign may be used for each use for a 
period of sixty days following the issuance of a 
permit to construct a permanent sign for that use. 
Upon inspection and approval of the permanent 
sign, or upon expiration of the sixty-day period, 
Whichever first occurs, the mobile sign must be 
Removed. Mobile signs may not employ animation, 
flashing lights or intermittent lights. (Ord. 1034 § 
1 (part), 1988) 
19.82.150 Traffic hazard prohibited. 
Signs or other advertising structures shall not be 
erected at the intersection of any streets or drive-
Ways in such manner as to obstruct free and clear 
689 (Salt Lake County 2-98) 
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Commercial lessee sued lessor for tres-
pass, conversion, and interference with pro-
spective business advantage, after lessor re-
moved from a business monument signs 
identifying lessee's business, and lessee's tri-
al brief raised the additional statutory claim 
of forcible entry. Following a trial, the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Divi-
sion I, Anne M. Stirba, J., entered judgment 
for lessee and awarded treble damages as to 
the forcible entry claim. Lessor appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held 
that: (1) the parties tried the forcible entry 
claim by implied consent; (2) defendant 
waived defenses that were not raised in re-
sponsive pleadings; and (3) lessee's interest 
in the signs was a "license," not a "lease," 
and thus, lessee's interest was not protected 
by the forcible entry statute. 
Judgment modified to exclude treble 
damages. 
Russon, J., concurred in the result and 
filed an opinion. 
1. Pleading 0=427 
Party may give implied consent to try 
issue not raised by the pleadings when party 
does not object to the introduction of evi-
dence at trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b). 
2. Pleading 0427 
Fact that plaintiff did not move to 
amend the pleadings to include his forcible 
entry claim did not make the trial court's 
consideration of the claim inappropriate, 
where claim was tned by implied consent of 
3. Appeal and Error 0^949 
Appellate court reviews for correctness 
trial court's application of civil procedure rule 
allowing issues not raised in pleadings to be 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b). 
4. Appeal and Error C^ >949 
Appellate court grants trial court fairly 
broad measure of discretion in determining 
under given set of facts whether parties have 
given implied consent to try issues not raised 
in pleadings, as such determination is highly 
fact intensive. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b). 
5. Pleading <5=>427 
Evidence supported finding that the par-
ties, by implied consent, tried plaintiffs stat-
utory forcible entry claim which was not 
raised in pleadings: defendant made no ob-
jection before or during trial to presentation 
of evidence related to forcible entry issue, 
both parties substantively addressed the is-
sue in their trial briefs, and both parties 
addressed the issue again during closing ar-
gument. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1 et seq.; Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b). 
6. Forcible Entry and Detainer @=>25(1) 
Defendant waives defense that plaintiff 
failed to comply with statutory indorsement 
requirement for forcible entry claim if defen-
dant fails to raise the defense in a responsive 
pleading or by motion before submitting a 
responsive filing. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-8; 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 12(h). 
7. Landlord and Tenant o=>291(7) 
Party waived statute of limitations de-
fense to statutory forcible entry claim by 
failing to raise the defense in a responsive 
pleading or by motion before submitting a 
responsive filing. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1 et 
seq.; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 12(h). 
8. Landlord and Tenant 0291(7) 
Assuming that one-year limitations peri-
od applied to statutory forcible entry claim, 
plaintiffs claim was timely, though claim was 
not raised in plaintiffs timely initial pleading 
and more than one year elapsed between the 
alleged forcible entry and plaintiffs first 
mention of the claim, as claim was tried bv 
Cite as 959 P.2d 
implied consent of parties and thus related 
back to initial pleading. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1 
et seq.; Rules CivJProc, Rule 15(b, c). 
9. Pleading c=>255.1 
Defendant, who expressly waived certain 
defenses in a post-trial hearing, could not use 
civil procedure rule permitting amendment of 
pleadings to revive those defenses. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rules 12(h), 15(a). 
10. Landlord and Tenant C=>20 
Licenses 044(2) 
A 'lease" conveys an interest in land and 
transfers possession, and thus must convey a 
definite space and transfer exclusive posses-
sion of that space to the lessee, while a 
"license" in real property is the permission 
or authority to engage in a particular act or 
series of acts upon the land of another with-
out possessing an interest therein, and is 
thus subject to the management and control 
retained by the owner. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
11. Landlord and Tenant c=>20 
Licenses C^44(2) 
In determining whether an instrument 
creates a lease or a license, the intention of 
the parties as ascertained from the instru-
ment itself prevails, but a court is not bound 
by the parties' characterization of their 
transaction or by any title they may have 
given a writing. 
12. Landlord and Tenant e=>39, 287.1 
Lease agreement for commercial prem-
ises gave lessee a "license," rather than a 
"lease/' as to signs identifying lessee's busi-
ness on a business monument, and thus, forc-
ible entry statute, which protected only real 
property interests, did not protect lessee as 
to lessor's unauthorized removal of the signs; 
lease agreement did not transfer possession 
°l any part of the monument to lessee, assign 
any definite space to him, or give him exclu-
d e possession of any space on the monu-
me
^t, but instead simply gave him permis-
sion to place two signs on the monument. 
U
-C.A.1953, 78-36-1(1, 2). 
102 (Utah 1998) 
13. Forcible Entry and Detainer e=>l 
A sign is not "real property," for pur-
poses of forcible entry statute governing en-
try upon or into real property, though the 
sign is affixed to a structure on real proper-
ty, as a sign is not a type of property that 
people can occupy. U.CA1953, 78-36-1(1, 
2). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
14. Landlord and Tenant 0 2 7 5 
At common law, a landlord could use 
self-help to forcibly enter a tenant's premises 
and evict the tenant without running the risk 
of incurring civil liability. 
15. Forcible Entry and Detainer C=>1 
Forcible entry statute protects only 
types of property that people can occupy. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1(1, 2i. 
Vincent C. Rampton, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Harold G. Christensen, Ryan E. Tibbitts, 
Paul M. Halliday, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dants. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice. 
Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc., 
and Dr. Robert L. Youngblood (collectively, 
"Youngblood") appeal a trial court award of 
treble damages against them and in favor of 
Dr. Clyde B. Keller. Keller brought an ac-
tion against Youngblood for trespass, conver-
sion, and interference with prospective busi-
ness advantage after Youngblood removed 
two signs owned by Keller from a business 
monument. Keller also argued that Young-
blood violated Latah's forcible entry statute. 
The trial court found that Youngblood's re-
moval of the signs violated the forcible entry 
statute and awarded Keller treble damages 
under that statute. See Utah Code §§ 78-
36-1 & -10. On appeal, Youngblood argues 
that the trial court erred in finding for Keller 
on his forcible entry claim because Keller 
failed to plead forcible entry in his complaint, 
failed to comply with the statute's require-
ments, and failed to bring his claim within 
the statute's one-year limitations period. 
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Youngblood also argues that Keller's access 
to signage space did not constitute real prop-
erty and therefore was not covered by the 
forcible entry statute and argues that the 
trial court erred in awarding treble damages. 
We modify the ruling to exclude the treble 
damages award. 
We first review the facts before turning to 
the standard of review and our analysis. In 
June of 1991, Keller leased office space from 
WCJD. Ltd. ("WCJD"), to house his chiro-
practic business. The space leased was in 
Southwood Plaza-South, an office building 
that, together with Southwood Plaza-North, 
forms the Southwood Medical Pavilion and 
Plaza ("Medical Pavilion") in Sandy, Utah. 
The Medical Pavilion has a large monument 
facing the street. Under the terms of their 
leases, Medical Pavilion tenants could place 
signs, typically small brass plaques, on this 
monument to advertise their services. The 
standard lease WCJD used for Southwood-
Plaza tenants, including Keller, provided that 
each tenant could put a sign on the monu-
ment but that all signs had to "be in keeping 
with other signs" as to size and location.1 
Keller, however, wanted a larger sign than 
the other tenants because he did not have an 
established practice in the area. WCJD 
agreed to allow him to place a 30-inch by 60-
inch sign on each side of the monument, 
subject to WCJD's approval of the signs. 
Keller agreed to pay WCJD an additional 
$50 per month for this privilege. Keller and 
WCJD memorialized this agreement in an 
addendum to their lease agreement.2 WCJD 
later approved Keller's signs, which were 
affixed to the monument with construction 
adhesive. 
1. Paragraph 12 of the WCJD Lease provided: 
ERECTIOS ASD REMOVAL OF SIGNS: 
Tenant may place suitable signs on the Premis-
es for the purpose of indicating the nature of 
the business carried on by Tenant in the Prem-
ises; provided however, that the location and 
size of such signs shall be in keeping with 
other signs in the Building where Premises are 
located Tenant shall remove such signs at 
the expiration ot this Lease or earlier termi-
nation thereof and repair am damage to the 
Premises caused b\ such removal. 
2. The addendum provided in pertinent part: 
In June of 1992, WCJD conveyed its inter-
est in the Southwood Plaza-North building 
and property, including the monument, to 
Valley Bank & Trust. In October of 1992, 
Valley Bank & Trust conveyed this property 
to Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc., a 
corporation Dr. Youngblood formed for the 
purpose of owning and managing this proper-
ty. WCJD retained title to Southwood Pla-
za-South. 
Shortly after the conveyance, Youngblood 
spoke to Keller about his signs. Youngblood 
told Keller that his signs were ''unprofession-
al" and that they should be removed. At this 
time, Youngblood was unaware of the adden-
dum to Keller's lease addressing the signs, 
and Keller was unaware that Youngblood's 
corporation owned the property on which the 
monument sits. Keller did not remove the 
signs. 
Approximately fourteen months later. 
Youngblood removed the two signs during 
daylight hours and in Keller's absence but 
without permission from or notice to Keller. 
Keller objected, and after attempts to resolve 
the problem failed, he relocated his practice 
to another building. 
Keller then filed suit against Youngblood 
and his corporation, alleging trespass, con-
version, and interference with prospective 
business advantage. On June IS. 1996, Kel-
ler submitted a trial brief addressing these 
issues. Two days later, Keller submitted a 
supplemental trial brief, asserting for the 
first time that Youngblood had violated the 
forcible entry statute. On June 24, 1996. 
Youngblood submitted his trial brief, ad-
dressing the merits of Keller's forcible entry 
claim as well as the three original claims. 
Youngblood did not object to the late asser-
C. Owner agrees to allow tenant to install 
at tenant's our. expense and risk, two 30 inch 
by 60 inch flat, non-electric signs, one on each 
side of the front monument. 
(a) The signs shall not interfere with an> 
existing signs alread> in place. 
(b) The signs must conform to any and all 
State or Local code or regulation. Any 
problems or costs shall be the Tenant's sole 
risk and expense. 
(c) The design and copy of signs must meet 
with owners written approval. 
(d) Tenant agrees to pay an additional 
$50.00 per month for this sign space. 
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tion of the forcible entry claim as outside the 
pleadings, nor did he assert a statute of 
limitations defense or argue that Keller 
failed to comply with the forcible entry stat-
ute's requirements. 
The trial court found that Youngblood's 
actions constituted trespass, conversion, in-
terference with prospective business advan-
tage, and forcible entry, and awarded Keller 
actual and punitive damages. At the close of 
trial, Keller reminded the court that under 
the forcible entry statute, he was entitled to 
treble damage^ The court awarded treble 
damages but allowed post-trial briefing and a 
hearing on the treble damages issue. Fol-
lowing this hearing, the court reaffirmed its 
treble damages award. 
On appeal, Youngblood argues that the 
trial court erred in finding for Keller on the 
forcible entry claim because (i) Keller failed 
to plead forcible entry in his complaint, (ii) 
he failed to satisfy the statute's indorsement 
requirements, »jd> a special one-year statute 
of limitations barred recovery, and (iv) Kel-
ler's access to signage space did not consti-
tute "real property" within the meaning of 
the forcible entry statute. We address each 
question in turn. 
[1] Youngblood first claims that Keller's 
failure to include the forcible entry claim in 
his complaint bars any recover}' under Utah's 
forcible entry statute. Keller responds that 
the parties tried the claim by implied con-
sent. Rule 15 b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure applies when parties try by ex-
press or implied consent issues not raised in 
the pleadings. Rule 15'b) provides: 
When issues not raised by the pleading are 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, the;, shall be treated in all respects 
as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 
Such amendments of the pleadings as may 
be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may 
be made upon motion of any party at any 
3
- The fact thai Keller did not mo\e to amend the 
Pleadings to >nciude his forcible entrv claim does 
^ot make me inul court's consideration of the 
Ciaim inappropriate Rule 15(b) states that "fail-
l e so to amjid doe* not affect the result of the 
lnal of .>^ues ^tned b\ express or implied 
consent] '* I :ah R Ci\ P. 15{b), see also Cla>k i 
102 (Utah 1998) 
time, even after judgment; but failure so 
to amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 15(b). "A finding of implied 
consent 'depends on whether the parties rec-
ognized that an issue not presented by the 
pleadings entered the case at trial.'" Do-
mar Ocean Transp. v. Independent Refining 
Co., 783 F.2d 1185, 1188 (5th Cir.1986) (quot-
ing Jimenez v. Tuna Vessel GRANADA 652 
F.2d 415 (5th Cir.1981)). A party may give 
implied consent when it does not object to 
the introduction of evidence at trial. See 
General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynas-
ty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976). 
However, "[w]hen evidence is introduced that 
is relevant to a pleaded issue and the party 
against whom the amendment is urged has 
no reason to believe a new issue is being 
injected into the case, that party cannot be 
said to have impliedly consented to trial of 
that issue." Domar Ocean Transp., 783 F.2d 
at 1188. 
[2] In applying rule 150)), the trial court 
should assess whether the parties tried an 
issue by express or implied consent. See 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). Once the court concludes that 
the parties did, the court must treat the 
issues in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. See Zions First 
Nat'l Bank v. Rocky Mountain /IT.. Inc., 795 
P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1990): Poulsen v. Poid-
sen, 672 P.2d 97, 99 (Utah 19S3).3 
[3, 4] Our review of the trial court's ap-
plication of rule 15(b) is a legal question that 
we review for "correctness." See State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). How-
ever, because the trial court's determination 
of whether the issues were tried with all 
parties' "implied consent" is highly fact in-
tensive, we grant the trial court a fairly 
broad measure of discretion in making that 
determination under a given set of facts. See 
id. at 939. 
Second Cir Ct., 741 P.2d 956, 957 (Utah 1987) 
("[FJailure to mo\e to amend the pleadings to 
conform to the evidence does not affect the fact 
that those issues were in fact tried b\ the consent 
of the parties and were therefore before the 
court."). 
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[5] We conclude that the trial court did 
not err by addressing the forcible entry is-
sue. The record contains substantial evi-
dence indicating that Youngblood tried the 
forcible entry claim by implied consent. 
Youngblood made no objection before or dur-
ing trial to the presentation of evidence relat-
ed to the forcible entry issue, and both par-
ties substantively addressed the issue in 
their trial briefs. Importantly, Youngblood 
reviewed Keller's supplemental trial brief 
that outlined the forcible entry claim before 
he submitted his trial brief. Instead of ob-
jecting to the claim as being outside of the 
pleadings or barred by a defense, Young-
blood addressed the claim on the merits. 
And both parties addressed the issue again 
during closing argument. Keller's attorney 
stated: 
[Youngblood] violated the forcible entry 
statute.. . We have, likewise, relied on 
the proposition that the removal and de-
struction of the sign constituted forcible 
entry. And there was a suggestion in 
[defendant's trial] brief . . . that the forc-
ible entry statute does not apply. It clear-
ly applies. It couldn't be more apropos in 
this situation There is a suggestion in 
[defendant's trial] brief that somehow [the 
statute] applies only to houses or enclo-
sures. I don't read that in the statute and 
I saw no case law for the proposition, nor 
do I know of [any] anywhere else. It's 
intended to apply to all leaseholds, proper-
ty. This was property. It was a fixture 
permanently affixed subject to a valid 
leasehold. 
4. Assuming, arguendo, that a one-vear limita-
tions period applies, the statute of limitations 
defense fails e\en li Youngblood did not waive it 
Youngblood ba>es his statute of limitations de-
fense on the fact that more than one vear elapsed 
between his removal of the sign and Keller's first 
mention of the forcible entn, claim This argu-
ment, however ignores the fact thai rule 15(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
amended claims relate back to the date of the 
original filing 
Rule 15(c) provides that a claim asserted in an 
amended pleading relates back to the date of the 
original pleading whenever the claim "arose out 
of the conduct transaction, or occurrence set 
forth m the original pleading " Utah 
R.Civ.P. 15(c) Because the parties tried the 
forcible entn claim by implied consent, Keller s 
Youngblood's attorney responded by arguing 
that the sign was not real property, was not 
a fixture, and was not permanently attached. 
Because these facts are enough to support 
the conclusion that Youngblood tried the 
forcible entry claim by implied consent, we 
find that the court properly considered this 
issue. 
[6, 7] In a post-trial brief, Youngblood for 
the first time argued that the one-year stat-
ute of limitations of section 78-12-29(2; 
barred the forcible entry claim and that the 
court's failure to indorse on the summons the 
number of days within which the defendant 
must appear, as required by section 78-36-8 
of the Code, precluded recovery under the 
statute. We find that both of these defenses 
were waived. 
[8, 9] Under rule 12 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, u[a] party waives all defens-
es and objections which he does not present 
either by motion . or, if he has made no 
motion, in his answer or reply/' Utah 
R.Civ.P. 12(h). A party waives a statute of 
limitations defense by failing to raise it in a 
responsive pleading or by motion before sub-
mitting a responsive filing. See Staker v. 
Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co., 664 P.2d 
1188, 1190 (Utah 1983); Utah R.Civ.P. 120i). 
Likewise, a party's failure to comply with 
section 78-36-8's indorsement requirement is 
a waiveable defense. See Fowler v. Seiter, 
838 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Be-
cause Youngblood failed to raise the statute 
of limitations4 and statutory compliance de-
fenses before he submitted a response—in 
this case his trial brief—he waived those 
defenses.5 
complaint was amended for purposes of rule 15 
Further, because the forcible entr> claim arose 
out of the same conduct set forth in Keller ^ 
original complaint, rule 15 U applies. Accord-
ingly, a one-\ear statute of limitations would not 
bar Keller's claim because the 15(b) amendment 
relates back to the filing date of Keller*s com-
plaint. Because we find that Dr. Youngblood 
waned the statute of limitations defense, we 
need not decide whether a one-vear limitations 
period, in fact, applies to a forcible entrv claim 
5. We recognize that rule \2 of the Utah Rules o! 
Ci\il Procedure can operate as an exception to 
the general rule that a pan\ waives a defense b> 
failing to raise it in a responsive filing Unde: 
rule 15(a), a part\ ma\ amend its pleading to 
assert a defense that it failed to raise in a respon-
KELLER v. SOUTHWOOD NORTH MEDICAL rAViJLiLL> 
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Moreover, Youngblood expressly waived 
these defenses during the post-trial hearing 
on the treble damages issue. Youngblood's 
attorney stated: 
After reading [plaintiffs] memorandum on 
the issue of waiver, I'm reluctantly inclined 
to agree that, although my predecessor 
counsel certainly should have objected, he 
didn't. And based upon that, I do think 
that those issues, [failure to plead forcible 
entry, statute of limitations, and statutory 
compliance] are probably waived. And so 
I'm not going to contest those. 
Finding that the trial court did not err in 
considering the forcible entry claim and that 
Youngblood waived any defenses, we now 
review the trial court's application of the 
forcible entry statute to the facts. Young-
blood argues that the district court erred in 
finding a forcible entry because neither Kel-
ler's sign nor his access to signage space 
constituted real property. The forcible entry 
statute provides: 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, 
who either: 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or 
other parts of a house, or by fraud, intimi-
dation or stealth, or by any kind of vio-
lence or circumstances of terror, enters 
upon or into real property: or, 
(2) after entering peaceably upon real 
property, turns out by force, threats or 
menacing conduct the party m actual pos-
session. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-1 (emphasis add-
ed). The district court made three conclu-
sions of law pertinent to the "real property" 
issue. It ruled that the monument was real 
property because it "was permanently affixed 
to real property'', that Keller's lease gave 
him "a valid and enforceable leasehold inter-
est" m the monument; and that Keller's 
lease rights in the monument "constituted a 
leasehold m realty." The district court then 
concluded that Youngblood committed a forc-
ible entry "in that [he] forcibly deprived 
Plaintiff of peaceable possession of his lease-
hold by self-help." 
Slve pleading if the part\ has lea\e of the court or 
c
°nsent of the ad\ erse pam See Staker v Hunt-
tngton Cleveland In Co, 664 P 2d 1188, 1190 
vutah 1983) However because Youneblood ex-
Because the trial court's finding of a forc-
ible entry turns on its conclusion that Keller 
had a valid leasehold in real property, we 
must first determine if a leasehold existed. 
This determination is a question of law that 
we review for correctness. See Pena. 869 
P.2d at 936. 
[10] A lease "conveys an interest in land 
and transfers possession." 49 Am.Jur.2d 
Landlord and Tenant § 21 (1995). A lease 
must convey a definite space and must trans-
fer exclusive possession of that space to the 
lessee. See id. In contrast, a license in real 
property "is the permission or authority to 
engage in a particular act or series of acts 
upon the land of another without possessing 
an interest therein," 25 Am.Jur.2d Ease-
ments and Licenses § 137 (1996), and is 
"subject to the management and control re-
tained by the owner." 49 Am.Jur.2d Land-
lord and Tenant § 21 (1996). 
[11] In determining whether an instru-
ment creates a lease or a license, "the inten-
tion of the parties as ascertained from the 
instrument itself prevails. Id. However, a 
court is not bound by the parties' character-
ization of their transaction or by any title 
they may have given a writing. 25 Am. 
Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 137 (1996). 
[12] We find that the lease agreement 
and the addendum gave Keller a license, not 
a leasehold interest. First, under paragraph 
12 of his lease, Keller, like all other tenants, 
had permission to place a sign on the monu-
ment. Paragraph 12 did not transfer posses-
sion of any part of the monument to Keller, 
did not assign any definite space to him, and 
did not give him exclusive possession of any 
space on the monument. Further, WCJD 
retained management and control of the 
monument under paragraph 12. 
The addendum covering Keller s signs did 
nothing to convert this license into a lease-
hold. Instead, the addendum merely altered 
paragraph 12's requirement that tenants 
could only place signs that were "in keeping 
pressk waived his defenses in the post-trial hear-
ing, he cannot avail himself of rule 15 to revive 
his defense 
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with other signs" on the monument. That is, 
the addendum gave Keller a license to place 
a larger sign on the monument. 
[13] For the benefit of the bench and 
bar, we think it useful to address whether 
the forcible entry statute would apply if Kel-
ler had had a valid leasehold interest. In 
other words, is a sign affixed to a structure 
on real property the type of property intend-
ed to be covered by the forcible entry stat-
ute? To understand the type of property 
covered by the forcible entry statute, we 
briefly review its history. 
[14,15] At common law, a landlord could 
use self-help to forcibly enter a tenant's 
premises and evict the tenant without run-
ning the risk of incurring civil liability. See 
Randy G. Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way 
Out: Making the Summary Eviction Pro-
cess a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative 
to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L.Rev. 759, 
776 (1994). After realizing the potential for 
violence that this rule of law created when a 
landlord used self-help to expel a tenant, 
many states passed forcible entry and detain-
er statutes.6 Id. Addressing the constitu-
tionality of Oregon's forcible entry statute, 
the United States Supreme Court stated: 
The landlord-tenant relationship was one 
of the few areas where the right to self-
help was recognized by the common law of 
most States, and the implementation of 
this right has been fraught with "violence 
and quarrels and bloodshed." . . . Hence, 
the Oregon statute was enacted in 1866 to 
alter the common law and obviate resort to 
self-help and violence. The statute, in-
tended to protect tenants as well as land-
lords, provided a speedy, judicially super-
vised proceeding to settle the possessory 
issue in a peaceful manner. 
Lindsey v. Norrnet 405 U.S. 56, 71-72, 92 
S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972); see also 
Paxton v. Fisher 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903, 
906 (1935) (noting that purpose of forcible 
6. Before institution of forcible entry statutes, En-
glish common law permitted one entitled to pos-
session of land to use an\ force reasonabh neces-
sary—short of force threatening death or serious 
bodih mjur\—to regain possession from another 
wrongfully withholding the land. In 1381, Eng-
land, under Richard II, passed a statute criminal-
entry statute is "to provide a speedy remedy, 
summary in character, to obtain possession 
of real property" and thereby prevent those 
seeking possession from taking "the law into 
their own hands"). Forcible entry statutes 
were designed primarily to help landlords 
and tenants settle disputes regarding posses-
sion and occupancy of real property. See 
Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 
100, 105 (1944) (Larson, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that forcible entry statute "has to do with 
actions to obtain possession, or protect one in 
retaining his occupancy of real property" 
(emphasis added)). Thus, we conclude that 
the forcible entry statute only protects types 
of property that people can occupy. A sign 
is not this type of real property, and there-
fore, the forcible entry statute does not apply 
in this situation. 
We hold that the trial court incorrectly 
concluded Keller had a leasehold interest in 
real property. Because Keller had no inter-
est in real property, the trial erred in apply-
ing the forcible entry statute. 
Judgment modified to exclude treble dam-
ages. 
HOWE, C.J., DURHAM, Associate C J., 
and BRYNER, Judge, concur in Justice 
ZIMMERMAN'S opinion. 
RUSSON, Justice, concurring in the 
result: 
I write separately only to express my dis-
approval of the majority's advisory opinion. 
After concluding that the agreement and ad-
dendum gave Keller a license, not a leasehold 
interest, the majority states, 'Tor the benefit 
of the bench and bar, we think it useful to 
address whether the forcible entry statute 
would apply if Keller had had a valid lease-
hold interest." Because no leasehold interest 
exists in this case, the issue as to whether 
the forcible entry statute applies to leasehold 
interests is not ripe for review. I see no 
reason to depart from our sound judicial 
izing the use of force to regain possession of 
land In 1840, the statute was held to provide a 
basis for ciul liabiht} See Gerchick, supra, at 
773-75 In 1872, Utah adopted a forcible entr% 
statute modeled after the English statute. Set 
Compiled Laws of Utah ch. 8, § 1196 (1872 
Cite as 959 P.2d 
iolicy against rendering advisory opinions. 
lee Stewart v. Utah Public Sen\ Comm'n, 
$5 P.2d 759, 784-85 (Utah 1994) (Howe, J., 
iissenting) (%<[I]t is not the province of this 
:ourt 'to exercise the delicate power of pro-
nouncing a statute unconstitutional in ab-
stract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot cases' 
such as the one now before us." (quoting 
Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 
1980))); Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist, 
724 P.2d 960, 962 n. 1 (Utah 1986) ("This 
court will not issue advisory opinions."); 
Justheim v. Division of State Lands, 659 
P.2d 1075, 1077 (Utah 1983) (where question 
is not ripe for adjudication, court's function is 
not to render advisory opinions); Black v. 
Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 410-11 (Utah 
1982) ("Judicial policy dictates against our 
rendering an advisory opinion."); Merhish v. 
H.A. Folsom & Assoc, 646 P.2d 731, 732 
(Utah 19821 ("[SJtrong judicial policy against 
issuing advisory opinions dictates that courts 
refrain from adjudicating moot questions."); 
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 504, 94 P.2d 
414, 424 (1939) (refusing to address constitu-
tionality of statute where determination not 
relevant to party's rights). 
Having disqualified himself, Justice Stew-
art does not participate herein; District 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner sat. 
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
Desiree HALL, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
WAL-MART STORES, INC.; Larry D. 
Moss, individually; Does I-X and Roe 
Corporations I-X, inclusive, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 970014. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 12, 1998. 
Patron sued store for negligence after 
she was struck by vehicle in store's icy park-
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ing lot. The District Court, Fifth District, 
Cedar City Department, J. Philip Eves, J., 
found store liable and awarded punitive dam-
ages. Store appealed after its motion for 
judgment notwithstanding verdict wras de-
nied. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., 
held that patron's failure to introduce evi-
dence of store's relative wealth wras not fatal 
to award of punitive damages. 
Affirmed. 
Russon, J., filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Howe, J., concurred. 
1. Appeal and Error 0237(5) 
Judgment <3=>199(5) 
Ordinarily, failure to make motion for a 
directed verdict forecloses consideration of 
later motion for judgment notwithstanding 
verdict and any appellate review of sufficien-
cy of evidence to support verdict. 
2. Appeal and Error 0863 , 934(1) 
Supreme Court will reverse trial court's 
denial of motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing verdict based on insufficient evidence to 
support verdict only if, viewing evidence in 
light most favorable to party who prevailed, 
it concludes that evidence is insufficient to 
support verdict. 
3. Appeal and Error <S=>863 
In order to prevail, party appealing de-
nial of motion for judgment notwithstanding 
verdict must marshal evidence in support of 
verdict and then demonstrate that evidence 
is insufficient when viewed in light most fa-
vorable to verdict. 
4. Damages <S=>184 
Introduction of evidence as to store's 
relative wrealth was not a technical prerequi-
site to an award of punitive damages in pa-
tron's negligence action against store to re-
cover for injuries sustained wThen she w7as 
struck by automobile in store's icy parking 
lot, where store did not challenge award on 
basis of excessiveness. 
